This paper analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings ("Fitch"), I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observed bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information. As a result, they tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and non-public information.
Introduction
Several facts have recently drawn public attention to the work and functioning of credit rating agencies. First and foremost was their failure to predict the Asian crisis and a wave of corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom, or Parmalat. Second was the potential procyclicality of their assessments and their increasing role in the regulatory mechanism of financial markets (Basel Committee, 2004) . Third have been a number of issues related to the transparency and integrity of the rating process (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2003; European Commission, 2004) . Among these issues, the practice of unsolicited ratings has prompted controversy among issuers, credit rating agencies, and regulators alike. Unsolicited ratings are formally defined as "ratings that credit rating agencies conduct without being formally engaged to do so by the issuer" (International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2003). As such, and contrary to solicited ratings, unsolicited ratings do not imply the payment of a rating fee and do not involve any formal meetings between the credit rating agency and the entity being rated.
1 These meetings typically provide an opportunity for credit rating agencies to get an overview of a company' s activities and to obtain more information than what is disclosed in its published annual reports.
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The main concern surrounding unsolicited ratings is the fact that they "do not appear to be empirically as favorable as solicited ratings" (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2005). Even though this could be interpreted as evidence that unsolicited ratings are assigned to "blackmail" issuers into paying for a solicited rating, it could also simply indicate that better-quality issuers request a rating or that credit rating agencies issue more conservative ratings in the absence of non-public information.
This paper contributes to the literature on unsolicited ratings by investigating whether there is a difference between Fitch' s solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and, if so, why. The analysis makes use of bank ratings assigned in Asia, i.e., the only region for which a significant portion of Fitch' s bank ratings are unsolicited. After confirming a systematic difference between unsolicited and solicited ratings for similar banks, the paper tests two hypotheses. The first is the "self-selection hypothesis", which states that solicited ratings tend to be higher than unsolicited ones because they are the result of self-selection, i.e., better-quality issuers self-select into the solicited group by choosing to obtain rating services. This hypothesis is tested using a treatment effect model and an endogenous switching regression model, both of which extend the standard model of sample selection due to Heckman (1979) .
A rejection of the self-selection hypothesis is consistent with at least two different interpretations: unsolicited ratings are lower to "punish" issuers who otherwise would not purchase ratings coverage; alternatively, unsolicited ratings are lower because they are based only on public information and, as a result, tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings. The latter gives rise to the second hypothesis tested by the paper: the "public disclosure hypothesis", which states that issuers who choose not to request a rating and who disclose a low amount of information receive a lower rating than do similar issuers who have solicited a rating. However, a high enough amount of information disclosure may eliminate the difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings. 3 In this paper, information disclosure is measured by an index capturing the level of accounting information released by issuers.
Interestingly, the importance of information disclosure for nonfinancial firms has Given the importance of information disclosure for nonfinancial firms, one should expect disclosure to play at least as important a role for banks. Indeed, several studies suggest that banks are inherently more opaque than nonfinancial firms. For instance, 3 Thus, the public disclosure hypothesis assumes that credit rating agencies view public and nonpublic information as partial substitutes for each other. This is not unrealistic. For instance, Heflin et al. (2003) and Bailey et al. (2003) find that Regulation Fair Disclosure had little effect on the forecast accuracy of equity analysts. They interpret this result as evidence that analysts offset the loss of non-public information by relying on improved public information.
Morgan (2002) reports that Moody' s Investors Service Inc. (Moody' s) and Standard and
Poor' s (S&P) disagree more often over banks' and insurance companies' ratings than over other types of firms' ratings and that Moody' s is systematically more conservative than S&P in its ratings, and relatively more so for banks. The latter finding can be explained by the fact that the opacity of banks' assets makes the conservative rating agency (Moody' s) err even more on the side of caution. 4 between solicited and unsolicited bank ratings using a sample where both types of ratings are identified as such. This represents an advantage over Butler and Rodgers (2003) and Gan (2004) , who are unable to distinguish clearly between solicited and unsolicited ratings in their analysis. Second, this paper addresses the issue of selfselection through both the use of a treatment effect model and an endogenous switching regression model (self-selection hypothesis). The above-mentioned studies do not, or only imperfectly, control for sample selection. Third, this study tests whether the difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings disappears when banks with unsolicited ratings release a high enough amount of public information (public disclosure hypothesis). As far as I am aware, this hypothesis has not yet been tested in the literature.
Several results emerge from the analysis. First, I find no evidence that, in determining ratings, Fitch assigns different weights to observable bank characteristics in the solicited and unsolicited groups. However, I do find that unsolicited bank ratings are lower than solicited ones after controlling for observable bank characteristics. The estimated difference between the two types of ratings is also economically significant, as it averages 0.9 notches on a 1 to 9 rating scale.
On the one hand, these findings appear to give some credence to Fitch' s claim that the methodology for its unsolicited bank ratings is "nearly the same" as for its solicited bank ratings (Fitch, 2001 ). On the other hand, they seemingly contradict Fitch' s assertion that there is no difference in its credit judgement of firms with unsolicited ratings (Fitch, 2005a) . In addition, they call into question the desirability of a recent decision by Fitch to give up disclosing whether its ratings are solicited or not.
A second result is that there is no strong evidence of a sample selection problem in bank ratings. Hence the self-selection hypothesis is rejected. Third, the results provide support for the public disclosure hypothesis. Banks which disclose a high amount of information receive better unsolicited ratings than do similar banks with unsolicited ratings but low levels of information disclosure. Banks which do not request a rating but which disclose a high amount of information receive ratings which are not statistically different from the solicited ratings of similar banks.
The latter finding is important in light of the fact that the theoretical impact of public disclosure on the relation between soliciting a rating and the actual rating outcome is ambiguous. On the one hand, the impact of public disclosure might be positive if issuers who do not request a rating and who disclose a high enough amount of public information receive the benefit of the doubt. On the other hand, the impact of public disclosure might be negative if it adds to negative perceptions or intuitions about issuers who choose not to be rated. This study suggests that the first effect dominates the second.
The results of the test of the public disclosure hypothesis are also of interest in the particular case of Fitch' s ratings. A former official of Fitch' s BankWatch 6 has acknowledged that "It is true that unsolicited ratings are often more conservative than solicited ratings. The reason is not that agencies are attempting to punish companies that decline to pay for a rating, but that where there is doubt, the agencies will tend to err on the side of caution. Correspondingly, the more information provided to the agencies, the more transparent the disclosure process, the more comfort agency analysts will feel in giving the company the benefit of the doubt (...) In the same manner, where in the case of an unsolicited rating, the issuer has not been very forthcoming with information, or places the burden of extracting that information on the agency analyst, it
is not surprising that the agency analyst will tend to err on the side of conservatism, and properly so. As a matter of practice, less disclosure tends to be associated with higher risk. In the context of risk assessment, disclosure is not only the means by which the assessment is performed, it is also arguably a positive credit consideration in itself".
(Golin, 2001, pp. 534-535).
Many market participants also appear to believe that low public disclosure explains the downward bias in unsolicited ratings. For example, the investment bank Merrill
Lynch noted that the low unsolicited ratings assigned to four major Egyptian banks by
Moody' s in 1997 were mainly due to "lack of cooperation regarding non-public information" along with "poor transparency of financial accounts" (Egypt State Information Service, 1997).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the background on unsolicited ratings. Section 3 presents the data used in the analysis. The research methodology is described in Section 4 and the results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes and offers some relevant policy implications.
Background on unsolicited ratings
Over recent years, there have been many instances in which credit rating agencies have been accused of assigning lower unsolicited ratings in order to "blackmail" issuers into paying for and participating in a rating process. A recent example cited as an In spite of the huge controversy surrounding unsolicited ratings, credit rating agencies insist on defending this practice. Their main argument is that they do not issue higher solicited ratings to keep existing customers or lower unsolicited ratings to attract new customers, as this would imply that they are willing to jeopardise their reputation in order to benefit from a temporary increase in revenues (Golin, 2001 ). In addition, credit rating agencies point out the following benefits of unsolicited ratings. First, unsolicited ratings should be seen as a service to investors and market participants who frequently make requests for coverage of institutions that are unwilling to undergo the rating process or pay a rating fee (Basel Committee, 2003; Fitch, 2005a) . Second, unsolicited ratings prevent firms from "rating shopping", a practice whereby firms only request an additional rating when they expect an improvement on their existing rating (Securities published a code of conduct for credit rating agencies that sets out a series of measures that agencies should incorporate into their own codes of conduct. In particular, the code asks credit rating agencies to "disclose whether the issuer participated in the rating process" and to identify each rating not initiated at the request of an issuer as such (IOSCO, 2004a) . Interestingly, Fitch' s reply was that it did "not believe that it is necessary or appropriate to require the disclosure of whether a rating is initiated or whether the issuer has cooperated in the rating process" and that such requirements "interfere in the editorial process of the rating agencies" (IOSCO, 2004b).
Finally, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) also recently recommended that credit rating agencies disclose whether they initiate their credit ratings and whether the issuer participates in the rating assessment process (CESR, 2005).
Data
The sample used in this study consists of solicited and unsolicited bank ratings assigned by Fitch in Asia. Fitch started to issue unsolicited bank ratings in this part of the world after its acquisition of BankWatch -a credit rating agency specialised in the banking sector -in October 2000. Prior to its absorption by Fitch, BankWatch used two types of rating scales in emerging markets, the so-called "intra-country issuer rating"
and "credit evaluation rating" scales. The latter scale mainly applied to unsolicited ratings of smaller institutions or banks in Asia. However, BankWatch did not systematically disclose whether its ratings were paid for or not (Golin, 2001) . Following the integration of BankWatch' s ratings into its own rating system, Fitch announced that ratings that were part of the credit rating evaluation scale and that were largely based on public information would be appended with an "s" (shadow) in its publications. Fitch nevertheless insisted that the methodology behind these shadow (unsolicited) ratings and the more traditional full due diligence (solicited) ratings was almost the same and that their definition and scale were identical (Fitch, 2001).
Fitch' s solicited and unsolicited bank ratings belong to a specific class of credit ratings known as "individual ratings". 8 These ratings, which are used primarily by interbank lenders, focus on the ability of issuers to satisfy their obligations in general, irrespective of the terms of any particular debt obligation. They thus differ from the more well-known debt ratings, which attempt to assess the risk that an issuer will not repay a specific security or class of securities, e.g., long-term debt. In addition, individual ratings do not take into account external support that an issuer might receive from its country of origin, which means in practice that they are not determined by the rating of the issuer' s country. is somewhat weak to very weak. Solicited ratings mostly fall into the B/C to D categories whereas unsolicited ratings are concentrated in the C to E categories. The fact that unsolicited ratings are more concentrated across the rating scale tends to confirm the perception of many issuers that these ratings are less accurate than solicited ones (Baker and Mansi, 2002 ).
In Table 3 Table 3 .
In addition, Fitch also emphasises its need for a detailed breakdown of banks' balance sheet and income statement when assigning a rating. This requirement is captured by a disclosure index, which can be found at the bottom of Table 3 accounts. Note that since Bankscope is a product of Fitch, it seems reasonable to assume that the disclosure index accurately reflects all the accounting information publicly available to this credit rating agency. Table 4 compares the mean and standard deviation of some bank characteristics in the solicited and unsolicited groups (the t-statistic for mean equality is given in the last column). Banks with unsolicited ratings have better asset quality (i.e., lower impaired loans/gross loans) but are less liquid and less capitalised than banks with solicited ratings. The difference between the performance of the solicited and unsolicited groups (as measured by the return on assets and the cost to income ratio) is not found to be statistically significant, 9 while no variable related to the securitisation category was found in Bankscope. Banks which request a rating are more likely to have a financial statement which is consolidated (62.2% in the solicited group vs. 44.2% in the unsolicited group) and which has been approved by the auditors without qualification (88.3% in the solicited group vs. 77.2% in the unsolicited group). There are more commercial banks in the unsolicited group (94.7%) than in the solicited one (77.0%). Interestingly, the sovereign credit rating and the diversification/franchise variables do not differ significantly across solicited status. However, banks which choose not to be rated are more likely to be located in communist countries, i.e., countries characterised by very different banking systems, than banks which choose to obtain rating services (2.7% in the solicited group vs. 22.1% in the unsolicited group). Corporate governance variables also show that banks requesting a rating have a statistically higher degree of involvement of individuals and families in their ownership (4.3% of equity owned by this type of shareholders in the solicited group vs. 0.4% in the unsolicited group), while banks which choose not to be rated have stronger ties to the State (28.3% of equity owned by this type of shareholders in the unsolicited group vs. 9.1% in the solicited group). In addition, banks rated on a solicited basis have significantly more subsidiaries (7.0) than banks rated on an unsolicited basis (3.2). This result does not seem to proxy for a size effect since the difference between the means of the "total deposits" variable in the solicited and unsolicited groups was not significant. Finally, the last row of Table 4 indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the level of disclosure of banks with solicited ratings and the level of disclosure of banks with unsolicited ratings.
Overall, Table 2 suggests that unsolicited ratings tend to be more frequently assigned at the lower end of the rating scale than solicited ones, while Table 4 shows some differences in the characteristics of the solicited and unsolicited groups. In order to answer the question of whether there is a difference in treatment between solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and, if so, to explain why, I now turn to the econometric analysis.
Methodology
This section outlines the methodology used to test whether banks with solicited ratings and those with unsolicited ratings obtain the same rating ceteris paribus.
Ordinary least squares
I first use a simple ordinary least squares regression of the form:
where Rating i corresponds to the individual rating of bank i coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E) scale, X i is a matrix of financial and nonfinancial characteristics that explain the The null hypothesis to be tested is whether = 0 , i.e.,
whether soliciting a rating has no effect on the rating itself once controlling for relevant bank characteristics. One issue that arises in this setup is the potential endogeneity of the variable Solicited i i.e., the possibility that corr (Solicited i , i ) 0, yielding biased and inconsistent least squares estimates. For instance, if the typical bank which chooses to request a rating would have a relatively high rating whether or not it asked to be rated, there will be a positive correlation between Solicited i and i . In this case, the least squares estimates of will actually overestimate the treatment effect. Therefore, I use two extensions of the standard model of sample selection due to Heckman (1979) to account for potential self-selection into solicited status. 
Treatment effect model
The treatment effect model complements the outcome equation (1) with the following latent model:
10 As a robustness check, I also estimated equation (1) using an ordered probit model. The results, which are shown in Table 9 (Appendix B), are very similar to those of ordinary least squares.
11 Poon (2003a) where W collects all variables in X plus any other variables that affect the decision to request an individual rating but not the rating itself. The model further assumes that X and W are exogenous and that and u follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean vector zero and symmetric covariance matrix equal to:
= . Using equation (1), one can show that the expected rating conditional on having requested one is given by:
where f denotes the normal density function and the normal cumulative function. For banks with unsolicited ratings, the counterpart to (5) is:
The difference in expected rating between banks which request a rating and those which do not is given by the difference between equations (5) and (6):
where the first term on the right-hand side, , measures the treatment effect and the second term in brackets is the hazard rate. If the latter term is omitted from equation
(1), the above difference is what is estimated by the least squares coefficient of the dummy variable Solicited i . For instance, in the presence of positive self-selection ( > 0 ), the second term in (7) is positive hence the least squares estimator of overestimates the treatment effect.
The treatment effect model can be consistently estimated by a standard instrumental variable approach or by a two-step approach in the spirit of Heckman (1979). The latter method, which is used in this study, consists in estimating a probit equation for the probability of soliciting a rating, before estimating equation (1) 
Endogenous switching regression model
All methods examined so far are based on equation (1), which assumes that soliciting a rating has only an intercept effect on individual ratings. However, soliciting a rating may also have a slope effect, i.e., the coefficients of the Xs may differ according to the solicited status. In addition, the above models assume that the variance of the if Solicited i = 1,
where it is assumed that X is exogenous and that 1 , 2 and u follow a trivariate normal distribution with mean vector zero and symmetric covariance matrix equal to:
. . .. Let the decision to request a rating be generated from the same model described by equations (2) and (3). One can show that the expected rating conditional on having requested one is given by:
For banks with unsolicited ratings, the counterpart to (11) is:
The difference in expected rating between banks which request a rating and those which do not is given by the difference between equations (11) and (12) 
where the first term on the right-hand side, X i ( 2 -1 ), is the average treatment effect (ATE), which measures the average gain or loss from soliciting a rating for a randomly chosen bank (this quantity was denoted by in the models of Sections 4.1 and 4.2).
Under fairly weak assumptions (Wooldridge, 2002), a consistent estimator of the average treatment effect is given by:
where is used to denote average andˆparameter estimates obtained by estimating the system formed by equations (2)-(3) and (8)- (9) .
Another quantity of interest in this model is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which measures the average gain or loss from soliciting a rating for those banks which have requested a rating. Formally, the average treatment effect on the treated is defined as: 
where X 2i denotes X i in the group of banks with solicited ratings. A consistent estimator of the average treatment effect on the treated is given by:
In this setup, a test for 22 11 0 == uu is a test of selection based on unobservable rating determinants. If the test fails to reject that both parameters are jointly equal to zero, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no selectivity bias in the solicited and unsolicited groups and we have no argument against using ordinary least squares. A Chow test can also be used to test whether the s are identical in the solicited and unsolicited groups. If they are, the treatment effect model is more efficient than the endogenous switching regression model.
The endogenous switching regression model is estimated by maximum likelihood using the procedure outlined in Greene (1995).
Results
In this section, I discuss the results of the estimation procedures described above.
Ordinary least squares
Two basic specifications of equation (1) are reported in Table 5 . To avoid multicollinearity problems, the first specification only includes five financial variables and four nonfinancial variables in addition to a solicited individual rating dummy. These variables cover the different areas of Fitch' s bank rating methodology: risk management (loan loss provisions/net interest revenue), liquidity (net loans/total assets), capitalisation (equity/total assets), earnings and performance (cost to income ratio), market environment (consolidated statement dummy, communist country dummy), diversification/franchise (log of total deposits), corporate governance (bank ownership dummy -one if the bank is majority-owned by another bank and zero otherwise), and public disclosure (disclosure index). The second specification adds two variables that control for additional aspects of market environment (unqualified statement dummy) and corporate governance (state ownership dummy -one if the bank is majority-owned by the State and zero otherwise). In addition, the second specification also interacts the solicited individual rating dummy with an other individual rating dummy, which is equal to one if the bank had an individual rating from a competitor agency -Moody' s or Capital Intelligence -before it obtained an individual rating from Fitch and zero otherwise. The resulting variable captures whether there is a rating difference between banks which request an individual rating without being rated by a competitor of Fitch and banks which request an individual rating while being rated by a competitor agency.
Such a difference may exist if banks which are already rated by Moody' s or Capital Intelligence engage in rating shopping and only request an individual rating from Fitch when they are a confident that it will be higher than their existing individual rating. 12 The two specifications are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and by twostage least squares (2SLS) to account for the potential endogeneity of equity/total assets and the disclosure index, i.e., the two variables that are most likely to suffer from an endogeneity bias (Bauman and Nier, 2004). The set of instruments for both variables consists of the other exogenous explanatory variables in the regression. In addition to these variables, I exploit the cross-country dimension of the data set by including country dummies which reflect the average level of the intrumented variables in each sample country. I also carried out a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, the null hypothesis for which states that OLS delivers consistent estimates, i.e., that instrumental variables techniques (2SLS) are not required. The value of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman statistic in specifications (1) and (2) is 2.37 and 2.67, respectively, with associated probabilities of 0.31 and 0.26, meaning that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that OLS delivers consistent estimates in both specifications. The discussion of Table 5 is therefore based on the OLS results.
The coefficient of the solicited individual rating dummy in specifications (1) and (2) is equal to 0.866 and 1.181, respectively, and is highly significant. This means that there is an important premium for banks which request an individual rating once controlling for other rating determinants. For other variables, the results appear to be standard. For example, loan loss provisions/net interest revenue, the cost to income ratio, and the communist country dummy negatively impact individual ratings, while higher values of equity/total assets, the consolidated statement dummy, the bank ownership dummy, and the disclosure index are associated with higher individual ratings. Other variables common to both specifications as well as the variables added in the second specification are not significant at the 95% level. In particular, the marginal effect that the other individual rating dummy has on how individual ratings are affected by the solicited individual rating dummy is zero. The statistics at the bottom of the table also indicate that the two specifications have similar prediction rates and classify about one-third of banks in the correct rating category and about one-half in the rating category 12 Note that no bank with unsolicited ratings from Fitch is rated by Moody' s or Capital Intelligence, which prevents analyzing whether there is a difference in the way Fitch treats banks not soliciting a rating but having a rating from a competitor agency versus banks which have no other rating.
immediately above or below the actual rating. Since the variables added in specification (2) are not or only marginally significant, I work with specification (1) from now on. 13 
Treatment effect model
The coefficient of the solicited individual rating dummy in Table 5 suggests that there is an important difference in treatment between banks which ask for a rating and those which do not. This result confirms the findings of the studies reviewed in the introduction. However, as noted earlier, ordinary least squares may overestimate the impact of the treatment if banks which request a rating are positively self-selected. For this reason, I proceed to use the methods described in Section 4.2 and 4.3 to correct for the potential sample selection bias. Table 6 reports the results of the treatment effect model. The first two columns report two-step estimates (Heckman, 1979) which treat equity/total assets and the disclosure index as exogenous. The last two columns report two-step estimates obtained by instrumenting equity/total assets and the disclosure index before applying the twostep method.
14 For each method (two-step and two-step + IV), Table 6 For identification purposes, the selection equation must include at least one variable that affects the decision to ask for a rating but not the rating itself. The variable which enters the selection equation but not the outcome equation is a solicited long-term debt rating dummy (one if the bank had a solicited long-term debt rating from Fitch before it obtained an individual rating and zero otherwise). 15 This variable is used as an exclusion restriction because Fitch started to issue long-term debt ratings in the 1980s, long before individual ratings. Therefore, banks which initially requested a long-term debt rating from Fitch should be more likely to have subsequently asked for an individual rating. At the same time, it is unlikely that paying for a long-term debt rating influenced the 13 I also interacted the solicited individual rating dummy with the other explanatory variables and found that it has an intercept but no slope effect on individual ratings. 14 The instruments for equity/total assets and the disclosure index are the same as in Table 5 . Robust t-statistics are in parentheses for the two-step estimates and bootstrapped t-statistics are in parentheses for the two-step + IV estimates. 15 For the minority of banks which obtained both types of ratings at the same time, the solicited long-term debt rating dummy is thus equal to zero. Setting the solicited long-term debt rating dummy to one if the bank had a solicited long-term debt rating before or at the same time it obtained an individual rating and zero otherwise does not affect the results.
individual rating. Since I view the decision to request an individual rating as a sequential process (i.e., banks' decision to buy an individual rating was influenced by their decision for the long-term debt rating), I treat the solicited long-term debt rating dummy as a lagged endogenous variable which does not have to be instrumented.
The results of the two-step and two-step + IV methods are relatively similar.
Therefore, I focus on the two-step results. Looking at the selection equation, the signs of the estimates suggest that banks which are located in a non-communist country, which publish a consolidated financial statement and which are already subscribing to Fitch' s long-term rating services are more likely to request an individual rating than other banks. Interestingly, financial variables do not seem to play a significant role in the decision to ask for an individual rating. The statistics at the bottom of the selection equation further indicate that the model correctly predicts the decision to request an individual rating for slightly more than two-thirds of the sample banks. Looking at the outcome equation, the estimates and their significance are in line with those reported in Table 6 except for equity/total assets and the solicited individual rating dummy, which are now only marginally significant. However, the coefficient of the hazard rate does not differ significantly from zero, implying that there is no evidence that there is a selectivity problem in the outcome equation. Finally, the statistics at the bottom of the outcome equation show that the classification accuracy of the treatment effect model is comparable to that of ordinary least squares.
Endogenous switching regression model
The results so far could be due to the fact that the above models are misspecified or too restrictive. For this reason, I consider a more general framework which allows the parameters of the outcome equation to differ according to whether or not banks have solicited a rating, while simultaneously controlling for sample selection. Table 7 reports the results of the endogenous switching regression model. For clarity, I only report the results of the outcome equations, i.e., equations (8) and (9), and the results of the selection equation are omitted. The first two columns report maximumlikelihood estimates (Greene, 1995) which treat equity/total assets and the disclosure index as exogenous. The last two columns report maximum-likelihood estimates obtained by instrumenting equity/total assets and the disclosure index before performing the maximum-likelihood estimation. 16 The dependent variable in each outcome equation is the bank individual rating.
Looking at Table 7 Second, a Chow test of the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual rating determinants are the same in the solicited and unsolicited groups was carried out. The value of the test statistic is 1.52 with an associated probability of 0.14, meaning that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients of individual rating determinants are identical in both groups and that the endogenous switching regression model is less efficient than the treatment effect model. This result contrasts with Butler and Rodgers (2003) , who find that soliciting a rating induces Moody' s and S&P to place less weight on rating determinants reflecting public information.
Third, an F-test of the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficients between the error term in the selection equation and the error terms in the outcome equations are jointly insignificant was performed. The value of the test statistic is 0.60 with an associated probability of 0.55, meaning that one cannot reject the null hypothesis that 12 and uu are both equal to zero and that there is no selection bias in individual ratings. Thus, the results in Table 7 (like the results in Table 6) To sum up, the ordinary least squares regression, the treatment effect model, and the endogenous switching regression model all find a positive and significant difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings. 17 However, the treatment effect model and the endogenous switching regression model both fail to provide evidence for a sample selection problem in individual ratings. There is thus no evidence that that these models are more appropriate than ordinary least squares to study the determinants of bank individual ratings. For this reason, I rely on OLS and 2SLS regressions to test the public disclosure hypothesis, the results of which are presented in Table 8 .
Test of the public disclosure hypothesis
According to the public disclosure hypothesis, banks which choose not to request a rating and which disclose a low amount of public information receive a lower rating than similar banks which have solicited a rating. However, banks which choose not to request a rating and which disclose a high enough amount of public information do not receive a lower rating than similar banks which have solicited a rating. The public disclosure hypothesis is tested using a regression of the form:
where Unsolicited i is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i has not requested a rating and zero otherwise, and High disclosure i is a dummy variable equal to one if bank i is a high disclosure bank and zero otherwise (the comparison group is thus the banks with solicited ratings). In the following, high disclosure banks are defined as those having a disclosure index equal to or higher than the 50 th percentile of the sample distribution of disclosure indexes, but the results also hold if higher percentiles are chosen.
18
Equation (17) is estimated by ordinary least squares and by two-stage least squares to account for the potential endogeneity of equity/total assets, Unsolicited interacted with High disclosure, and Unsolicited interacted with (1 -High disclosure). As in previous regressions, the instruments consist of the exogenous variables in equation (17) and country dummies. Since a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that OLS delivers consistent parameter estimates (the value of the test statistic is 12.6 with an associated probability of 0.01), the discussion of Table 8 is based on the 2SLS results.
Looking at Table 8 , the estimated coefficients of the first seven explanatory variables (loan loss provisions/net interest revenue to log of total deposits) are close to those shown in Table 5 , which is not surprising given that equations (1) and (17) for rated EU-25 banks compared to 62.9 for rated Asian banks). 19 Moreover, the disclosure level of rated EU-25 banks appears to less homogenous than that of rated Asian banks (the standard deviation of the disclosure index is equal to 17.0 for rated EU-25 banks compared to 14.7 for rated Asian banks). Thus, there may be reason to believe that a lack of public disclosure might also explain any potentially lower unsolicited ratings of European banks.
Conclusion
This paper investigates whether there is a difference between Fitch' s solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and, if so, why. Using ratings assigned to Asian banks, I find no evidence that, in determining bank ratings, Fitch assigns different weights across solicited and unsolicited groups to observable bank characteristics. This result gives some credence to Fitch' s claim that the methodology for its unsolicited bank ratings is "nearly the same" as for its solicited bank ratings (Fitch, 2001 ). However, I do find that unsolicited bank ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones after controlling for observable bank characteristics. The difference between both types of ratings is economically significant, as it averages 0.9 notches on a 1 to 9 rating scale.
The existence of a difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings has already been documented for other credit rating agencies. Several explanations are consistent with such a difference, including the fact that better-quality issuers may request a rating or that unsolicited ratings do not involve the disclosure of non-public information and, as a result, may be more conservative than solicited ones. In addition, many issuers also believe that credit rating agencies assign a lower unsolicited rating to persuade them to pay for a solicited rating.
In contrast to previous research on the differences in solicited and unsolicited ratings, the analysis of this paper explicitly controls for potential sample selection by using a treatment effect model and an endogenous switching regression model to test whether better-quality banks self-select into the solicited group (self-selection hypothesis).
Although the analysis does find a significant difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings, no evidence is found in favour of the sample selection hypothesis. The analysis also tests whether the difference between solicited and unsolicited ratings disappears for banks with unsolicited ratings but which disclose a high enough amount of information (public disclosure hypothesis). Support is found for this hypothesis: banks with unsolicited ratings but a high amount of disclosure receive ratings that are not significantly different from the ratings of similar banks which have solicited a rating.
The above-mentioned findings are interesting for several reasons. First, possible measures concerning the use of unsolicited ratings are currently being discussed at the European and U.S. levels (SEC, 2003; European Commission, 2004) . Although the results of this study find no evidence of wrongdoing by Fitch, they support additional measures designed to clarify the differences between solicited and unsolicited ratings. For instance, it should be required that credit rating agencies clearly label unsolicited ratings as such in their publications and that they make the specific characteristics and the limitations of this type of ratings, inclusive of the conservative bias documented in this paper, completely transparent to the public. In this respect, Fitch' s recent decision to
give up disclosing whether a rating is solicited or not in its regular publications does not represent a step toward more transparency in the credit rating industry. It also contradicts the new IOSCO code of conduct for credit rating agencies, which clearly states that "each rating not initiated at the request of issuer should be identified as such" (IOSCO, 2004) .
Second, the New Basel Accord, which is due to be implemented by G-10 banks at the beginning of 2007, aims at increasing public disclosure by banks in order to ensure that market participants can better understand banks' risk profiles and the adequacy of their capital positions (Basel Committee, 2004) . It is therefore necessary that financial institution managers understand the need for more disclosure and move in this direction on their own. This paper provides an incentive for bank managers to disclose information as it documents the impact of public disclosure on credit ratings and on the relation between soliciting a rating and the actual rating outcome. Public disclosure not only appears to have a positive effect on credit ratings, but it also seems to eliminate the downward bias of unsolicited ratings.
Third, Fitch recently announced that it was about to assign unsolicited ratings to European and U.S. insurance companies "in order to provide more comprehensive coverage" in the European and U.S. insurance sectors "to meet the growing demand" for its ratings. In contrast to traditional solicited insurance ratings, these ratings would be "generated solely using a statistical model that utilizes financial statement information" (Fitch, 2004b; Fitch, 2005c ). Fitch' s announcement triggered an immediate reaction from the German Insurance Industry Association (GDV), which expressed its deepest concerns and urged Fitch to refrain from publishing any unsolicited ratings unless the new rating methodology had been "fully disclosed and widely discussed with the German insurance industry and the general public" (GDV, 2004). Fitch replied by clarifying some points underlying its methodology for unsolicited insurance ratings but decided to press ahead with the publication of these ratings (Fitch, 2005d) . The results of this paper, which indicate the existence of a conservative bias in unsolicited ratings of low disclosure banks, suggest that insurance industry associations should be more worried about the level of public disclosure of their members than by the issuance of unsolicited ratings per se.
Finally, it is worth stressing once again that the credit ratings used in this study are assigned to banks located in Asia. To some extent, this may limit the relevance of the results of this paper for other contexts. Although this caveat implies that the policy recommendations should be interpreted with care, the fact that European banks exhibit a comparable and more dispersed level of public disclosure than Asian banks suggests that the results could well carry over.
European The t-values in the last column refer to the t-statistics of the means between the solicited rating group and the unsolicited rating group; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in each regression is the bank individual rating coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E) scale. The first two columns report ordinary least squares estimates which treat equity/total assets and the disclosure index as exogenous. The last two columns report two-stage least squares estimates obtained by instrumenting equity/total assets and the disclosure index with the other (exogenous) explanatory variables and country dummies which reflect the average level of the intrumented variables in each sample country. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The table reports the results of the treatment effect model. The first two columns report two-step estimates (Heckman, 1979) which treat equity/total assets and the disclosure index as exogenous. The last two columns report two-step estimates obtained by instrumenting equity/total assets and the disclosure index before applying the two-step method (the instruments for equity/total assets and the disclosure index are the same as in Table 5 ). For each method (two-step and two-step + IV), the table reports the results of the selection and of the outcome equations. The dependent variable in the selection equation is the solicited individual rating dummy (1 if solicited, 0 otherwise). The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the bank individual rating coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E) scale. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses for the two-step estimates; bootstrapped t-statistics are in parentheses for the two-step + IV estimates; * sign. at 10%; ** sign. at 5%; *** sign. at 1%. The table reports the results of the endogenous switching regression model. The first two columns report maximum likelihood estimates (Greene, 1995) which treat equity/total assets and the disclosure index as exogenous. The last two columns report maximum likelihood estimates obtained by instrumenting equity/total assets and the disclosure index before performing the maximum-likelihood estimation (the instruments for equity/total assets and the disclosure index are the same as in Tables 5 and 6 ). The dependent variable in each equation is the bank individual rating coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E) scale. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses for the maximum-likelihood estimates; bootstrapped t-statistics are in parentheses for the maximum-likelihood + IV estimates; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. The dependent variable in each regression is the bank individual rating coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E) scale. The first column reports ordinary least squares estimates which treat equity/total assets, unsolicited´ high disclosure, and unsolicited´ (1 -high disclosure) as exogenous. The last column reports two-stage least squares estimates obtained by instrumenting equity/total assets, unsolicited´ high disclosure, and unsolicited´ (1 -high disclosure) with the other (exogenous) explanatory variables and country dummies which reflect the average level of the intrumented variables in each sample country. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Appendix A. Fitch' s individual ratings: definition and scale
Definition:
Individual Ratings are assigned only to banks. These ratings, which are internationally comparable, attempt to assess how a bank would be viewed if it were entirely independent and could not rely on external support. These ratings are designed to assess a bank' s exposure to, appetite for, and management of risk, and thus represent our view on the likelihood that it would run into significant difficulties such that it would require support. The principal factors we analyze to evaluate the bank and determine these ratings include profitability and balance sheet integrity (including capitalization), franchise, management, operating environment, and prospects. Finally, consistency is an important consideration, as is a bank' s size (in terms of equity capital) and diversification (in terms of involvement in a variety of activities in different economic and geographical sectors).
Scale:
A A very strong bank. Characteristics may include outstanding profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects.
B A strong bank. There are no major concerns regarding the bank. Characteristics may include strong profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects.
C An adequate bank, which, however, possesses one or more troublesome aspects. There may be some concerns regarding its profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects.
D A bank, which has weaknesses of internal and/or external origin. There are concerns regarding its profitability and balance sheet integrity, franchise, management, operating environment or prospects. Banks in emerging markets are necessarily faced with a greater number of potential deficiencies of external origin.
E A bank with very serious problems, which either requires or is likely to require external support.
Intermediate categories, i.e., A/B, B/C, C/D, and D/E, are also used.
Source: http://www.fitchratings.com/ Appendix B. Table 9 compares ordinary least squares and ordered probit estimates of equation (1). The dependent variable in each regression is the bank individual rating coded on a 9 (A) to 1 (E) scale. The first two columns report ordinary least squares estimates. The last two columns report ordered probit estimates (for brevity, estimated cut points of the ordered probit are omitted). Robust t-statistics are in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
